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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Second Judicial District Court in
and for Davis County, State of Utah. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). This appeal is subject to transfer by the Supreme Court
to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). The Supreme Court transferred
this appeal to the Court of Appeals by Order dated April 23, 2007. (R. at 750). This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The statutes and rules whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or are of
central importance to the appeal are as follows:
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2
Utah Code Ann. §78-33-11
Utah Code Ann. §78-33-12
Utah Code Ami. §78-40-1
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)
Utah R. Civ. P. 19
Utah R. Civ. P. 56
Utah R. Civ. P. 59
Utah R. Civ. P. 60
These statutes and rules are set out verbatim in Addendum A to this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

1.

This is an appeal, ostensibly from an order entered September 25, 2006,1

granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff Horton V. Bourne Partnership, Ltd.,
("Bourne"), and from a judgment, entered September 25, 2006, which implements that
order. However, the asserted grounds for appeal were either not raised in the trial court
in connection with the order and judgment appealed from, or not raised at all.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court.

2.

Bourne filed its Complaint in this matter on September 20, 2005. (R. at 1.)

The Complaint named as defendants two individuals, Steve Glezos ("Glezos") and Glen
Pettit ("Pettit"). {Id.) It also named an entity called "STC Holdings/' which it alleged
was a partnership between Glezos and Pettit. {Id.)
3.

The Complaint alleged that Bourne was the owner of some 16.19 acres of

real property located in Davis County, Utah (the "Property"), which it had contracted to
sell to defendants by means of a "Purchase Agreement" it entered with "STC Holdings or
assigns." (R. at 23.) The Purchase Agreement provided that STC Holdings was to pay
Bourne "$600,000 or $37,060 per net useable acre" on a Closing date {i.e., on or before
July 13, 2005) in exchange for the Property. (R. at 4, 9.)

Appellants Notice of Appeal states that they are appealing from an order dated March
3, 2007. There is no such order. Adding to the confusion, Appellants' caption
indicates that the case is on appeal from orders dated September 8, 2006 and April 3,
2007. There is no September 8, 2006 order. Bourne assumes Appellants meant to
refer to the trial court's summary judgment order entered September 25, 2006.
2

4.

The Complaint alleged that the defendants had failed in several respects to

comply with their obligations under the Purchase Agreement (R. at 4-14), and that the
Closing date had come and gone without proper performance by defendants. (R. at 9.)
As a result, the Complaint alleged that the Purchase Agreement "expired by its terms and
any beneficial interest STC had in the property was extinguished by operation of law."
(R. at 10.)
5.

The Complaint further alleged that after the failed Closing, defendants had

wrongfully filed a "Notice of Interest" on the Property, when they knew they had
breached the Purchase Agreement, and had no rights beneficial or otherwise in the
Property. (R. at 11-13.)
6.

On the basis of these allegations, the Complaint pled six causes of action:

(1) a declaratory judgment claim, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 etseq., pursuant to
which Bourne sought a declaration regarding the meaning of certain provisions of the
Purchase Agreement, and a declaration that defendants had failed to comply with those
provisions; (2) a claim seeking to have title quieted in Bourne against claims and interests
adverse to Bourne; (3) a claim for breach of the Purchase Agreement; (4) a claim seeking
to have a "Notice of Interest" filed by defendants declared a wrongful lien, and null and
void; (5) a claim for slander of title; and (6) a claim for interference with economic
relations. (R. at 10-14.)
7.

STC Holdings and Glezos served an Answer to the Complaint on October

14,2005. (R. at 34.) Pettit served an Answer on February 9, 2006. (R. at 104.) The
Answers asserted, among other defenses, that Bourne had failed to join an indispensable
3

party, Land Solutions, L.C. (R. at 25, 101.) The Answers then cryptically claimed Land
Solutions was a Utah limited liability company "which holds the 'doing business as'
name registration for 'STC Holdings,' which is an artificial name and/or which is the
assignee of the enforceable contractual rights to acquire the parcel pursuant to the
enforceable sale-purchase agreement." (R. at 25.)
Land Solutions' Intervention
8.

On October 14, 2005, Land Solutions, represented by the same counsel as

all the other defendants, filed a motion to intervene. (R. at 35-37.) Bourne did not
oppose intervention, and on November 23, 2005 the trial court orally granted Land
Solutions' motion and instructed Land Solutions' counsel to prepare a written order. (R.
at 41-42.)
9.

Bourne objected to Land Solutions' proposed written order because, in

addition to allowing Land Solutions' intervention, it purported to dismiss STC Holdings
from the case. Bourne's counsel prepared a revised version of the order, which clarified
that STC Holdings was not dismissed, approved it as to form, and transmitted it to
defendants' counsel. (R. at 685, 770:7.)
10.

Defendants' counsel apparently failed to submit any proposed written order

to the court regarding Land Solutions' intervention, and no written order was ever
entered. (R. at 770: 7-8.)
11.

However, after filing the motion to intervene, Land Solutions participated

in virtually all proceedings before the trial court, without any objection from Bourne.
Defendants' counsel thereafter appeared as "Attorney for Defendants STEVE GLEZOS,
4

STC HOLDINGS, LAND SOLUTIONS, L.C. and GLEN PETTIT," (R. at 90, 97, 100,
105, 345, 380, 399, 467, 470, 584, 587, 597, 600, 655 and 657 (emphasis added).
Virtually every paper defendants filed was filed on behalf of Land Solutions. (R. at 90,
97, 100, 105, 110, 345, 380, 399, 467, 587, 597, 600 and 655.)
Motion to Dismiss Glen Pettit
12.

On February 10, 2006, concurrently with Pettit's Answer, defendants filed

a "Motion to Dismiss Glen Pettit From Litigation." (R. at 110.) In the motion
(presumably filed under Rule 12), defendants contended that Pettit should be dismissed
because "alleged co-defendant GLEN PETTIT has no involvement in the said purchasesale transaction." (R. at 106.) Relying on an affidavit from Glezos, the motion further
contended that Pettit was not "associated with LAND SOLUTIONS, L.C. as a member,
manager, investor, employee or agent of any kind," (id.), that the Purchase Agreement
was negotiated by Glezos "for business purposes and not in any kind of 'agency' or
'partnership' relation for or in behalf of Mr. PETTIT." (Id.)
13.

Bourne filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on February 27,

2006, (R. at 162, 168), pointing out that under Rule 12 defendant's motion could
challenge only the legal sufficiency of the allegations of Bourne's Complaint, not their
truth. (R. at 163.) Bourne's memorandum further pointed out that, despite defendants
claim that Pettit had "no involvement" in the sale, defendants had produced documents
which showed the opposite. (R. at 166.) In particular, as part of their initial disclosures
defendants had produced a "Settlement Statement" for the Bourne Property signed by
Pettit pursuant to which defendants were claiming they had properly closed under the
5

Purchase Agreement. On this basis, Bourne urged there was "evidence that Mr. Pettit
was involved in the Purchase Agreement, and [that] Mr. Glezos and Mr. Pettit operate as
partners." (R. at 167.)
14.

Thereafter the motion laid dormant. A "Request to Submit" for decision

was finally filed on August 10, 2006, just four days before the previously scheduled
hearing on Bourne's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 470.) No request for hearing
was filed until after Borne's summary judgment motion has been granted. (R. at 655-56.)
Bourne's Motion for Summary Judgment
15.

On April 17, 2006, Bourne filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against

defendants ("Summary Judgment Motion"). (R. at 342-344.) The motion sought an
order "(1) granting this Motion for Summary Judgment on all causes of action alleged by
Plaintiff in this action; (2) awarding damages; and (3) requiring Defendants to pay costs
and fees incurred by Plaintiff in bringing this lawsuit." {Id.)
16.

On May 2, 2006, defendants (including Land Solutions and Pettit) filed a

consolidated response to Bourne's motion. (R. at 345-377.) The response failed to
comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B) in that it did not include a "verbatim restatement
of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted." In the few places it did take
issue with the undisputed facts, it also failed to comply with Rule 56(e)'s requirement
that a party opposing a summary judgment motion "not rest upon the mere allegations or
denial of the pleadings," but "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); see (R. at 345-377, 574). In fact, in several places in

6

their brief defendants specifically stated "the Defendants believe and assert that the
'material facts' are not in 'genuine dispute.'" (R. at 345-346.)
17.

Defendants argued that Bourne was advancing an erroneous interpretation

of the Purchase Agreement, (R. at 349-52), and that they had complied with the Purchase
Agreement, (R. at 353-57).
18.

But they were silent on the arguments they now urge as grounds for appeal.

In particular, defendants did not argue either (i) that they had performed all relevant acts
in a "corporate capacity," or (ii) that Bourne had failed to join and indispensable party.
(R. at 345-377.)
19.

The Summary Judgment Motion arguments were heard by the trial court on

August 14, 2006. (R. at 472.) The court granted the Summary Judgment Motion. (Id.)
20.

Bourne prepared the order granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

Judgment and hand-delivered it to defendants for their review on September 8, 2006. (R.
at 573-583.) Defendants did not make any objection to the form or content of the
proposed Summary Judgment Order. Accordingly, after the time specified in Rule
7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure had passed, Bourne submitted the proposed
Summary Judgment Order to the court and the defendants on September 19, 2006. (R. at
583.)
21.

The court entered the Order Granting Summary Judgment on September

25,2006. (R. at 573-583.) The Judgment was entered the same day. (R. at 568-572.)

7

Defendants9 Post-Judgment Motions
22.

On October 10, 2006, defendants filed a motion styled "Motion to Set

Aside Judgment, Motion for Relief from Judgment, Motion for New Trial and for Other
Relief ("Motion to Set Aside"). (R. at 584.) No supporting memorandum was filed
with the motion. (Id.)
23.

Defendants' two-and-a-half page Motion to Set Aside set forth three

grounds for the requested relief: (1) the judgment was entered prematurely; (2) the
judgment improperly "implicated" defendant Pettit personally; and (3) the judgment
improperly "implicated" defendant Glezos personally. (R. at 584-586.) The motion did
not cite to any facts or legal authority to support its requests. (Id.)
24.

Then, on December 26, 2006, defendants filed a "Rule 60(b) U.R. C.P.

Motion." (R. at 661-663.) There, defendants argued that (1) it was a "mistake" to hold
Glezos and Pettit personally liable, and for Land Solutions not to have intervened; and
(2) it was a mistake for defendants not to have more strenuously and effectively argued
against Bourne's motion for summary judgment. (R. at 666-78.) Defendants asked the
trial court correct these "mistakes," under Rule 60(b), by: (1) dismissing Glezos and
Pettit, (2) allowing Land Solutions L.C. to intervene, (3) setting aside the Judgment,
(4) nullifying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and (5) granting defendants 30
days to file a counterclaim. (R. at 677.)
25.

Bourne timely opposed both the Motion to Set Aside (R. at 605-611), and

the Rule 60(b) Motion (R. at 679-691).

8

January 25, 2007 Hearing
26.

On January 25, 2007, the trial court heard arguments on all pending

matters, including defendants' post trial motions and defendants' objections to Bourne's
claimed attorneys' fees. (R. at 770.)
27.

The defendants admitted that through all of their motions they were

essentially looking for a "do-over." (R. at 770:9.) Even as defendants admitted their
ultimate goal, they also admitted that they, the defendants, were at fault for the alleged
"mistakes" made by the trial court, including: (1) the failure to submit an order granting
Land Solutions, L.C. intervention (R. at 770:7-8), (2) the failure to raise the issue of
individual liability during the motion for summary judgment briefing (R. at 770:8), (3)
the failure to join indispensable parties (R. at 770:14) and (4) the failure to make a
counterclaim (R. at 770:11).
28.

At the hearing, defendants withdrew their "Objections" to Proposed Award

of Plaintiff s Attorney's Fees and Demand for Trial on Attorney's Fees Issue/Claims. (R.
at 770:29-30.) The trial court denied all of the remaining motions before it. (R. at
770:35-39.)
29.

Defendants filed notice of appeal on April 13, 2007. (R. at 732.) This

appeal is subject to transfer by the Supreme Court to this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(4). The Supreme Court transferred this appeal to this Court by Order
dated April 23, 2007. (R. at 750.)

9

C.

Statement of Facts
30.

Because defendants did not properly oppose the statement of undisputed

facts in Bourne's summary judgment motion, the court deemed them admitted. (R. at
574.) However, since the personal liability of Glezos and Pettit was not contested in
connection with the summary judgment motion, it was not a focus of the statement of
undisputed facts. Notwithstanding that, the record reflects substantial evidence which
shows that Glezos and Pettit conducted business in a remarkably casual and flexible
manner; one that allowed them change their story depending on the expediencies of the
moment.
31.

In his pleadings and other court papers, Glezos treats himself, STC

Holdings, and Land Solutions as one and the same. For instance, in defendants' Initial
Disclosures, Glezos claims that he wwand/or STC HOLDINGS and/or LAND
SOLUTIONS, LC" claim entitlement to specific performance as "Buyer" of the Property.
(R. at 92.)
32.

In his responses to Bourne's interrogatories, Glezos similarly treats himself,

STC Holdings, and Land Solutions as one and the same. For instance, he notes "[t]he
answers herein, although written in the first person pronouns (i.e., "I" or "my") should be
deemed to apply also to the business entities." (R. at 313-314). Thereafter, Glezos
describes how he treated the Purchase Agreement:
I signed the Real Estate Purchase Agreement, with addenda,
for the Property's acquisition from the Bourne entity. . . . I
thereafter made arrangements for the sale of the Property to
Fieldstone Homes. When the uFieldstone" transaction did not
10

materialize, I made arrangements to effect the sale to Mr.
PETTIT, acting through his business entity."
(R. at 315.)
33.

The May 3, 2006 Affidavit of Steve Glezos, which defendants filed in

connection with their opposition to Bourne's summary judgment motion, similarly
reflects either that Glezos (and not Land Solutions or STC Holdings) was the "buyer" of
the Property, or that Glezos and Land Solutions and STC Holdings are one and the same:
In 2004 I contacted my real estate agent Patrick Bodnar and
requested that he contact Mr. Peter Hanlon . . . for purpose of
making inquiry concerning the sale of the subject parcel. . . .
He presented to the Mr Hanlon the 9-page "PURCHASE
AGREEMENT" . . . which had been prepared by me.
*

*

*

*

I directed Mr. Bodnar to tell Mr. Hanlon the "closing" was to
occur at Merrill Title Company offices in Midvale, Utah on 8
July 2005. I caused to be deposited with Merrill Title (as
designated "escrow") the sum of $430,062.96, which
represented the $37,060 per acre sales price, times the
11.5998 "net useable acres... ."
(R. at 380-382).
34.

The original documents Glezos used to document his transactions similarly

reflect a unity of interest and ownership between Glezos and Land Solutions and STC
Holdings. For instance, on March 14, 2005, Land Solutions entered an "Option and
Purchase Agreement" with Pettif s 90th South Joint Venture, which purported to give
them an option to purchase the Property. (R. at 337-338). However, Land Solutions,
STC Holdings and Steve Glezos all separately signed as "Seller." (R. at 339)

11

35.

Then, on July 7, 2005, another "Purchase Agreement" was signed, wherein

"Land Solutions, L.C. or STC Holdings, or Steve Glezos" assign and transfer the same
property to "90th South Joint Venture, L.C, or Assigns." (R. at 339).
36.

Notwithstanding the purported option and assignment, on July 15, 2005,

after the transaction failed to close, STC Holdings filed a Notice of Interest on the
Property. (R. at 229)
37.

Similarly, in his deposition Pettit provides substantial evidence that there is

a unity of interest and ownership between himself and 90th South Joint Venture. First, he
testifies that he "came up with the name 90th South Joint Venture" because it owns a
piece of land on 90th South." (R. at 701.) Second, he testified that 90th South Joint
Venture is wholly owned by Glen Pettit. Third, Pettit consistently described the interest
in the Agreement and the Property as his personally, saying that it was his interest to
trade. (R. at 609, 705.)

12

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

The trial court properly entered summary judgment against defendants

Steve Glezos and Glen Pettit. Bourne's Motion for Summary Judgment plainly sought
judgment against Glezos and Pettit, personally. Yet neither Glezos nor Pettit argued that
personal liability was inappropriate because they were acting exclusively in a "corporate
capacity" in their dealings with Bourne. Indeed, the identity of the "Buyer" in the
context of the Purchase Agreement was fluid, depending on the exigencies of the
moment. During the proceedings, defendants made no attempt to distinguish any
separate rights or liabilities of each defendant under the Purchase Contract.
It was not until after the Judgment had been entered that defendants argued, for the
first time, that Glezos and Pettit had no personal liability in this matter. Defendants'
failure to raise this issue before the trial court in the context of the summary judgment
motion precludes them from raising the issue on appeal. Defendants' post-trial motions
are ineffective to preserve the issue because issues raised in motions filed after entry of a
summary judgment order are not properly considered in reviewing a challenge to the trial
court's summary judgment order. Further, defendants have not properly challenged the
trial court's denial of their post-trial motions. Defendants are therefore foreclosed from
pursuing on appeal the arguments rejected by the trial court.
Different legal principles govern Glezos' and Pettit's personal liability under each
of the causes of action pled in this case. Under Counts I and II of the Complaint, Bourne
sought a declaratory judgment regarding the Purchase Agreement and an order quieting
title in the Property in Bourne against all adverse claims, including those of Glezos and
13

Pettit. In determining whether the declaratory judgment and quiet title order were
properly entered against Glezos and Pettit, the salient question is whether Glezos or Pettit
has or claims an interest in the Purchase Agreement or Property which would be affected
by the declaration and quiet title order. Based upon the undisputed facts, the answer is
plainly u yes." Accordingly, the trial court could properly enter a declaration regarding
Glezos' and Pettit's respective rights, if any, in the Purchase Agreement, and could quiet
title to the Property in Bourne against their adverse claims, whatever the nature of their
claims or interest.
Count III of the Complaint asserted a claim against all defendants for breach of the
Purchase Agreement. While Glezos and Pettit seek to be shielded from personal liability
on the ground that they acted on behalf of their respective entities, they acknowledge that
a trial court may disregard the corporate form under the equitable "alter ego" doctrine.
Glezos and Pettit never asserted the bona fides of their purported limited liability
companies in opposing Bourne's motion for summary judgment. Conversely, Bourne
presented substantial evidence that Glezos and Pettit conducted their private and
corporate business on an interchangeable basis and that there was such a unity of interest
and ownership that the separate personalities of Glezos and Pettit and their various
entities ceased to exist. Based upon this substantial undisputed evidence, the trial court
properly disregarded the form of Glezos' and Pettit's entities and imposed personal
liability upon Glezos and Pettit, including liability for Bourne's attorneys' fees.
Counts V and VI of the Complaint asserted tort claims for slander of title and
interference with economic relations against all defendants, including Glezos and Pettit
14

individually. Utah law is clear that a corporate officer may be held personally liable for
corporate torts in which they participate without piercing the corporate veil. Even
assuming, arguendo, that Glezos and Pettit were acting in "corporate capacities," the
undisputed facts show that both Glezos and Pettit personally participated in conduct
which the trial court held slandered Bourne's title and interfered with Bourne's economic
relations. Consequently, the trial court could properly enter judgment against Glezos and
Pettit, individually, on these tort claims.
II.

The trial court did not err in not requiring formal joinder of Land Solutions,

L.C. as a party to this action because Land Solutions was a de facto party. Defendants
contend, and therefore concede, that "STC Holdings" is only a fictitious name for Land
Solutions, not a separate entity. Accordingly, when Bourne sued STC, it effectively sued
Land Solutions. Furthermore, notwithstanding the failure of its formal attempt to
intervene, Land Solutions nevertheless fully participated in all proceedings before the
trial court without any objection from Bourne. Indeed, Defendants' counsel appeared as
"Attorney for ... Defendant Land Solutions, L.C." and filed numerous substantive papers
on Land Solutions' behalf. In view of Land Solutions' substantial, active participation in
this litigation, both in its own name and in its fictitious name, no reversible error may be
predicated on the lack of formal j oinder.
Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering the joinder of
90th South Joint Venture as an indispensable party. Defendants failed to raise this issue
in the trial court, thus depriving the trial court of the opportunity to rule on the issue in
the first instance. While it is true that failure to join an indispensable party may be raised
15

for the first time on appeal, defendants must still address from an appellate perspective
the competing interests suggested by Rule 19(b), which are: (1) whether 90th South has
an interest greater than Bourne's interest in preserving its fully litigated judgment; (2)
whether 90th South will be subject to multiple litigation or inconsistent relief; (3) the
nature of 90th South's interest, if any; and (4) the interest of the court in a complete,
consistent and efficient settlement of the case, including the fact that the time and
expense of a trial have already been spent.
Defendants wholly ignore these competing interests and argue only that the trial
court should have sua sponte joined 90th South when Pettit's relationship with 90th
South became apparent. Defendants further fault Bourne for not joining 90th South as a
party. However, defendants fail to acknowledge their own culpability in the matter. If,
as defendants allege, 90th South had an interest in the transaction, it could have easily
sought intervention, thus avoiding the convoluted process of taking "steps" to address the
issue of nonjoinder. 90th South's failure to intervene belies defendants' argument that
failure to join 90th South was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Where 90th South
was plainly aware of this action, but chose not to claim an interest by failing to seek
intervention, it cannot be considered a necessary or indispensable party.
Even if this Court were inclined to consider whether joinder of 90th South is
necessary or appropriate, defendants have made no effort to present evidence from the
record to demonstrate that 90th South is a necessary party under Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). In
fact, the record plainly shows that 90th South is not a necessary party. Complete relief in
the form of the declaratory judgment and quiet title order could be, and was, accorded
16

among those who were already parties, 90th South's interests were more than adequately
protected by the presence of its manager, sole member, and privy Glen Pettit, and none of
the parties are subject to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent
obligations. 90th South is not a "necessary" party and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion but not ordering its joinder.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
AGAINST STEVE GLEZOS AND GLEN PETTIT.
Defendants claim that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment against

Steve Glezos and Glen Pettit "personally." (Appellants Br. 13-15.) Defendants claim
that this ruling was error because - according to defendants - the trial court found that
"Glezos and Pettit were acting on behalf of limited liability companies''^, and "Utah law
protects organizers, members, managers and employees from personal liability for actions
taken while acting for the limited liability company." {Id. at 14.)
As we show in the sections below, this claim of error should be rejected for two
reasons: (1) defendants did not, in opposition to Bourne's motion for summary judgment,
timely raise the "corporate capacity" argument they now urge. Accordingly, they may
not claim it as a basis to appeal the summary judgment order; (2) the trial court's entry of
judgment against Glezos and Pettit personally was, in any event, correct under the
undisputed facts and applicable law.

2 This assertion overreads the trial court's order. With respect to Glezos, the order
stated only that "the Bourne Partnership and Steve Glezos, acting as STC Holdings,
entered a contract for the purchase and sale of the Burke Lane Property." (R. at 575.)
But "acting as" Land Solutions does not address - much less foreclose - Glezos from
being found to be Land Solutions' alter ego. Nor does it address or foreclose Glezos'
personal participation in tortious conduct. Similarly, with respect to Pettit, the order
stated only that he "executed the Assignment of Purchase Agreement as the
authorized agent and sole member of 90th South Joint Venture, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company." (R. at 578.) This language also does not address whether Pettit is
90th South Joint Venture, or whether Pettit personally participated in tortious conduct.
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A.

Defendants Failed To Timely Raise "Corporate Capacity" As An
Objection To Bourne's Motion For Summary Judgment And Are
Barred From Doing So Here.

The first problem with defendants' "corporate capacity" argument is that they did
not raise it in the trial court when they opposed Bourne's motion for summary judgment.
Bourne filed its summary judgment motion on April 17, 2006. (R. at 342.) The motion
clearly sought judgment in Bourne's favor on all claims for relief, (R. at 342), and clearly
sought judgment against all defendants. (Id.) In opposition, all defendants (i.e., "Steve
Glezos, STC Holdings, Land Solutions, L.C. and Glen Pettit") filed one consolidated
memorandum. (R. at 345.) These defendants asserted that Bourne was advancing an
erroneous interpretation of the Purchase Agreement. (R. at 349-52.)3 They further
argued, based on their own interpretation of the Purchase Agreement, that Bourne's
claims about the requirements of the contract were unfounded. According to the
defendants, (i) the Purchase Agreement did not require defendants "to make objection to
the usability of the property" (R. at 353-54); (ii) defendants' calculation of the amount of
"net usable acres," and not Bourne's, was in accordance with the requirements of the
Purchase Agreement (R. at 355-56); (iii) defendants were not required to "tender the full

3 Defendants conceded that the case could appropriately be decided on a motion for
summary judgment. (R. at 345-46 ("Defendant is not, per se, opposed to the Court's
adjudicating this case on a 'summary judgment' basis.. . . Indeed, the Defendants
believe and assert that the 'material facts' are not 'in genuine dispute'"), 348 ("the
Defendants welcome and invite the Court's exercise of the 'declaratory judgment'"),
349 ("The Defendants do not necessarily oppose the 'declaratory judgment' portions
of Plaintiff s 'motion"; in fact, the Defendants welcome and invite the Court's insight
and definitive ruling as to the parties' rights and obligations").)
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purchase price of $600,000" at closing (R. at 356); and (iv) the Purchase Agreement did
not expire on July 13, 2005 (R. at 357).4 But nowhere in defendants' opposition did they
suggest that Glezos or Pettit should be shielded from individual liability because, in
dealing with Bourne, they had been acting solely in a bona fide "corporate capacity"
rather than as individuals. Nor did they suggest that the court treat them separately in
considering Bourne's motion.
It is axiomatic that this Court does not entertain on appeal claims that were not
raised below. See, e.g., Chapman v. Uintah County, 81 P.3d 761, 765 (Utah App. 2003);
State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, ^[5, 63 P.3d 66; see also James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799,
801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial
may not be raised for the first time on appeal"); Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d
754, 758 (Utah 1984); see Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, (Utah App. 1994); U.P.C.,
Inc., v. R.O.A. General Inc., 1999 UT App 303, ^ 33, 990 P.2d 945; Myrah v. Campbell,
2007 UT App. 168, If 18, 163 P.3d 679.5

4 In its September 25, 2006, Judgment, the trial court specifically rejected each of these
contentions. (R. at 569.) Oddly, in this appeal defendants do not contest these, or any
of the trial court's other substantive summary judgment rulings. Instead, defendants
apparently object only to the fact that the rulings were made against them
individually, as opposed to the limited liability companies they own. (Appellants'
Docketing Statement 2-3 (summarizing the issue on appeal as whether personal
liability may be imposed); Appellants' Br. 1-2 (listing the issues on appeal as whether
personal liability may be imposed and whether additional parties should be held
liable).)
5 Utah courts recognize a limited exception to this rule where the claimed error
constitutes "plain error," or where there are "exceptional circumstances." See Duke v.
Graham, 2007 UT 31, ^ 26-28, 158 P.3d 540 (internal citations omitted). "To
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Here, defendants admit that they did not raise their "corporate capacity" argument
in connection with plaintiffs summary judgment motion. Indeed, their briefs "Citation
to Record Showing Issue was Preserved" cites not to their opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, or to the summary judgment hearing, but to their "Motion to Set
Aside The Judgment, For Relief From The Judgment And For A New Trial." (Appellants
Br. 1.)
A proper and timely-filed Rule 59 motion may toll the time for filing a Notice of
Appeal, but that does not make the Rule 59 motion a part of the summary judgment
record. Indeed, this Court has made very clear that issues raised in a Rule 59 motion
filed after the entry of a summary judgment order are not properly considered in
reviewing a challenge to the summary judgment order itself. For instance, in Dikeou v.
Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah App.1994), this Court refused to address an argument
that a party had improperly "bolstered" the record after summary judgment had been
entered, stating "this court is well aware of its responsibility to review a trial court's grant
of summary judgment using only the information on file at the time the trial court granted
the motion." Similarly, in U.P.C., Inc., v. R.O.A. General Inc., 1999 UT App 303, If 33,

demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) an error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant.'" Berkshires, L.L.C. v. Sykes, 2005 UT App 536, If 21, 127 P.3d 1243
(internal citations omitted). But, to raise a claim of "plain error" the appellant must
affirmatively assert it in its opening brief. Id. at \ 20 (internal citations omitted).
Here the defendants have not claimed either plain error or exceptional circumstances,
and so these doctrines are inapplicable. Even if defendants had so claimed, there is no
plain error in this case for the reasons stated in Section IB below.
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990 P.2d 945, in the context of a summary judgment order that was not fully dispositive,
this Court refused to consider an argument because it "was not before the trial court until
[Appellant's] Reply Memorandum in support of its [Rule 54(b)] motion to revise."
Even if defendants' post-judgment motion were part of the summary judgment
record, the defendants have failed to preserve for review any issues raised therein because
they have failed to properly challenge the trial court's denial of that motion. While
defendants have appended the "Order On Post-Trial Motions" to their Brief, defendants
have failed to set forth any factual or legal argument for reversal of that Order.6 (See
Appellants Br., 1-2 (Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal).)
Defendants' "Motion To Set Aside" claims to be filed "pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 59, Rule 60 and/or other applicable rules of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. . . ." (R. at 584), but it failed even to attempt to show any circumstance
specified in either rule. It simply set forth three grounds for the requested relief, (1) the
judgment was entered prematurely; (2) the judgment improperly "implicated" defendant
Pettit personally; and (3) the judgment improperly "implicated" defendant Glezos
personally, without providing any action to facts or supporting authority.
It is well settled that "[a] trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a
showing of at least one of the circumstances specified in Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)." Moon
6 Defendants STC Holdings, Steve Glezos and Glen Pettit subsequently served
"Defendants' Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., Motion" and supporting memorandum on
December 26, 2006. The trial court denied this motion by order filed April 3, 2007.
(R. 728-730.) Defendants do not even reference this Rule 60(b) motion or contest the
trial court's denial of the motion.
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Lake Electric Assoc, v. Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988). Further, even if such a showing is made, "the trial court's ruling on a
motion for a new trial will be disturbed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion." Id.;
see also Lange v. Eby, 2006 UT App 118, \ 6, 133 P.3d 451 ("[a] trial court has
discretion in determining whether a movant has shown [Rule 60(b) grounds], and this
Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of
discretion"). Defendants have made no effort on appeal to demonstrate that their
purported Rule 59 motion showed any of the circumstances specified in Rule 59, nor
have they made any effort to show how the trial court's denial of the motion was an
abuse of the trial court's discretion.
The arguments urged in defendants' post-trial motion were rejected by the trial
court and the trial court's denial of defendants' post-trial motion is unchallenged on
appeal. Accordingly, defendants' post-trial motion arguments cannot form the basis for
their appeal of the trial court's summary judgment ruling.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Entered Judgment Against Glezos and Pettit
Personally.

Even if defendants had preserved their "corporate capacity" argument, it would
not provide a ground to reverse the trial court's summary judgment order. Defendants
have painted with a broad brush in making their argument, dealing collectively with all of
the claims asserted in the Bourne Complaint. But to properly analyze whether judgment
could correctly be entered against Glezos and Pettit, the Court must consider each of the
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causes of action pled in the Bourne Complaint separately. Different legal principles
govern individual liability under each of the causes of action pled.
1.

Bourne's Declaratory Judgment and Quiet Title Claims.

In Counts I and II of the Complaint, Bourne asked the trial court for a declaratory
judgment regarding the meaning of the Purchase Agreement, and to quiet title to the
Property in Bourne, against adverse claims (including those of the defendants).7
These causes of action are, essentially, creatures of statute. Utah statutes describe
who may be named as a defendant in such actions, and what the effect is of any judgment
entered on such claims. For instance, the Utah Declaratory Judgments Act, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-33-1 through -13 allows "[a]ny person interested under a deed, will or written
contract. . . [to] have determined any question of construction or validity arising under
the instrument.. . [or] contract. . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal
relations thereunder," (Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2 (2007)), and it provides Utah courts
with the power to make such declarations "whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed." Id. § 78-33-1. The statute further provides that proper defendants to a
declaratory judgment action include parties "who have or claim any interest which would
be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not
parties to the proceeding." Id. § 78-33-11.8 Similarly, under § 78-40-1 of the Utah

7 In Count IV, Bourne also sought to have defendants' "Notice of Interest" on the
Property, declared null and void based on the declaration. (R. at 12-13, 15.)
8 Despite this language, it is clear that matters litigated and determined by a declaratory
judgment are subject to the res judicata rules. 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
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Code, "[a]n action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or
interest in real property or an interest or claim to personal property adverse to him, for the
purpose of determining such adverse claim."
Accordingly, in determining whether judgment was properly entered against
Glezos and Pettit on the declaratory judgment and quiet title causes of action, the
question is, wCdo Glezos or Pettit 'have or claim any interest which would be affected by
the declaration,' {id. §78-33-11), or do they claim an estate or interest in the Property
adverse to Bourne?" The answer is "yes."9
1.

Glezos has from the beginning through to today maintained that he

has an interest in the Purchase Agreement and the Property, although the way he
describes it has changed.
a.

Glezos and STC Holdings filed a joint'"Answer," to Bourne's

Complaint. The Answer did not differentiate between the two entities or specify that one
maintained an interest in the Property to the exclusion of the other. (Indeed, it defined
the term "Defendants" to mean "[t]he Defendants STC HOLDINGS and STEVE
GLEZOS." (R. at 24 (emphasis added).) In response to Bourne's allegation that it was
and is "the owner of fee title to and is in possession of the Property. . . .", (R. at 12),
R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4446 (2d
ed. 2007); Fidelity Natl Bank & Trust Co. of Kansas City v. Swope, 21A U.S. 123
(1927); see also Gillmor v. Gillmor, 2001 UT App. 25, ^f 4, (unpublished) (stating that
a declaratory judgment may have res judicata effects).
9 Indeed, if they do not have or claim a direct or indirect interest in the real property, it
is hard to see why they have gone to the bother of appealing the judgment in this
regard.
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Glezos' Answer claimed that he and STC Holdings "assert an equitable interest in the
subject real estate, pursuant to the aforementioned real estate sale-purchase agreement"
(R. at 31). In the Answer's prayer, Glezos asked the trial court for a judgment "that the
real estate purchase contract is enforceable according to its terms, that the same should be
enforced, and that the Plaintiff should be ordered to specifically comply with the sale
requirement and should be judicially ordered to sell to Defendants [i.e., Glezos and STC
Holdings] the subject parcel." (R. at 33.)
b.

Glezos, STC Holdings, Land Solutions, L.C., and Pettit

similarly filed a joint set of "Initial Disclosures." (R. at 90.) There Glezos also claimed
an interest in the property:
Defendants (notably, GLEZOS and/or STC HOLDINGS
and/or LAND SOLUTIONS, L.C.) claim entitlement to
specific performance under the real estate purchase
agreement. Alternatively, Defendants - without waiving their
claim for specific performance - assert entitlement to
compensatory damages based upon the profits they would
have realized, had the Plaintiff actually conveyed the parcel
to the Defendants, in a timely manner, at the anticipated
closing, and the Defendants thereafter been able to develop
and/or market the parcel.
(R. at 92.)
2.

The record reflects that Pettit also has claimed he has an interest in

the Purchase Agreement and the Property, either directly in his own name, or indirectly
through 90th South Joint Venture, LLC - a purported limited liability company of which
he is the manager and sole member. On March 14, 2005, Pettit purportedly obtained the
"exclusive right and privilege to purchase [the Property]," by means of an "Option." (R.
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at 337.) The option was prepared with the name of the buyer in blank. (Id.) Pettit filled
in the name of 90th South Joint Venture, and signed. (Id.) On July 7, 2005, Pettit
executed another agreement wherein "Land Solution, L.C, or STC Holdings or Steve
Glezos" purported to assign to u90th South Joint Venture, L.C. or Assigns," their interest
in the Purchase Agreement. (R. at 339.) At his deposition, Pettit consistently described
the interest in the Agreement and the Property as his personally, saying that it was his
interest to trade. (R. at 609.) Notwithstanding this assertion, defendants moved to
dismiss Pettit from this action on the ground that he had no involvement in the
transaction, and he has at various times maintained this as well. (R. at 110-111, 600604.). 10

10 Mr. Pettit's claim of an interest is more apparent in materials that were cited in briefs
filed with the trial court, but apparently erroneously were not themselves attached as
exhibits. (R. at 609.) For instance, in Bourne's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Set Aside, Bourne cites to pages 24 and 25 of Pettit's deposition. Id. There Pettit
testifies as follows:
Q:

And then am I right that later, on July 7th, 2005, you
and Mr. Glezos executed an Assignment of Purchase
Agreement, that's page three of Exhibit 22?

A:

That is the date this paper is signed, but we had always
intended that deal be part of that. I don't know why
that date of signature would be different.

Q:

It could be earlier, but at least by July 7th of 2005,
Land Solutions, by means of this page three, had
assigned all of its right, title and interest in that
purchase agreement with the Bournes to you?

A:

Right.
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3.

Perhaps most telling in determining whether Glezos and Pettit claim

an interest in the Property is the position they are taking in this appeal. While they both
want to be dismissed from the case, it is not because they disclaim any interest in the
Property. Both want to be dismissed in order to relitigate the summary judgment.
Disclaiming an interest in the Property is something both individuals easily could have
done, but did not do, in the court below. To the contrary, although defendants have not
attacked the substance of the trial court's declaratory judgment, in this Court they "seek
to have the summary judgment order and judgment vacated" and further seek "to have
this case remanded with instructions to allow Land Solutions, L.C. [the LLC which
Glezos owns and manages] and 90 South Joint Venture LLC [the LLC of which Pettit is
the sole member] to intervene, assert counterclaims, conduct discovery, and join thirdparties." As defendants' counsel frankly admitted at the hearing on post-trial motions,
they "are - basically, Your Honor, for lack of a better term, it's a do-over," (R. at 770 at
9). In other words, Glezos and Pettit are seeking to be dismissed so they can relitigate in
the name of their single-member LLCs the summary judgment that they lost as
individuals.

Q:

And so as of July 7th, whatever purchase or interest
there was in that contract with the Horton Bourne
Partnership, that was your interest now, correct?

A:

Yes.

Deposition of Glen Pettit, at 24-25.
28

The Utah Declaratory Judgment Act explicitly states that it is to be liberally
construed to effect its remedial purpose:
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle
and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be
liberally construed and administered.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-12. Following this directive, Utah courts have broadly allowed
declaratory judgment actions. See Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Salt Lake County
Attorney, 1999 UT 73, ^ 12, 985 P.2d 899; Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d
119, (Utah 1977). Indeed, Utah courts have, at least tacitly, approved quiet title and
declaratory judgment involving portion with interests similar to those presented here. For
instance, in Gray v. Defa, 135 P.2d 251 (Utah 1943) the plaintiff brought a declaratory
judgment action regarding real property, and named as defendants certain individuals
who "claimed certain rights in and to the lands through some claim of interest in a
contract of sale and certain leasehold agreements, the exact nature of which were
unknown to the plaintiff, but were adverse to her title." Id. at 252.
In their Answers and Counterclaims, the Gray defendants asserted various
interests in the real property arising out of, variously, "a contract to purchase the land,"
"separate lease agreements," and "various assignments of the contract of sale and the
leasehold agreements." Id. The Utah Supreme Court held it was error for the trial court
to refuse to allow counterclaims in such an action, but apparently had no concern over
whether the interests defendants asserted were appropriate to support declaratory
judgment or quiet title action. Id. Similarly, in Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004
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UT App. 44, f 20, 87 P.3d 734, this court expressed no concern over the fact that an
individual sought to prosecute a quiet title action involving real property owned by a
limited liability company of which he was a member.
Because Glezos and Pettit claim an interest in the property, the trial court's
judgment against them on Counts I and II was correct.
2.

Bourne's Slander of Title and Interference With Economic
Relations Claims

In Counts V and VI of the Complaint, Bourne asserted a slander of title claim and
an interference with economic relations claim against all defendants. (R. at 13-14.)
These are tort claims.
In Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^f 19, 70 P.3d 35,
the Utah Supreme Court explained that officers and directors of corporations could be
held personally liable for corporate torts, if they participated in the wrongful conduct. Id.
(citing 3 A William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 1137, at 209 (rev. ed. 2002)).
InD'Elia v. Rice Development, Inc., 2006 UT App 416, If 43, 147 P.3d 515, this
Court explicitly extended these rules to members and managers of limited liability
companies:
We are persuaded by those authorities that hold that both
limited liability members and corporate officers should be
treated in a similar manner when they engage in tortious
conduct. We therefore conclude that Harrison's imposition
of personal liability on corporate officers who participate in a
corporation's tortious acts, also applies to limited liability
company members or managers.
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Id. (citations omitted). In so ruling, this Court made clear that "holding an officer or
director personally liable for corporate torts in which they participate is distinct from the
piercing the veil doctrine." Id. at \ 39 (citing L.C.L. Theatres, Inc., v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 619 F.2d 455, 457 (5th Cir. 1980)(corporate officer "may be personally as
responsible as the corporation itself for tortious acts when participating in the
wrongdoing" and "[i]n these circumstances, it is not necessary that the corporate veil be
pierced or even discussed").
Here, defendants' sole defense is that their limited liability companies shield them.
But it is undisputed that Land Solutions, L.C. and 90 South Joint Venture are (i) single
member limited liability companies, (R. at 575, 221); (ii) managed respectively by
Glezos and Pettit, (R. at 313, 221); and (hi) are not claimed to have any employees,
managers, or agents other than Glezos and Pettit (R. at 313, 575, 221). In these
circumstances, courts have held individuals liable in tort because the company could only
act through the owner. For instance, in McDonald v. Frontier Lanes, Inc., 272 N.E.2d
369, 377 (111. App. Ct. 1971) the court stated:
In this case Ceresa was the president, sole shareholder and
manager of Frontier. He owned and operated the business and
its corporate acts or omissions could only be those
participated in by him. The acts and omissions of Frontier
giving rise to the negligence charged in this case were not
isolated incidents brought about by conduct of an employee,
for example, but were a part of the general mode of operation
of the corporate business under Ceresa's sole power of
direction and control. We find, as a matter of law, that
defendant Ceresa is personally liable for the negligence of the
corporate defendant, Frontier, in this case.
31

3.

Bourne's Breach of Contract Claim.

Although defendants are loath to admit it, the breach of contract claim (and its
concomitant attorneys' fees award) is the only claim to which their "corporate capacity"
argument is even relevant. Defendants seek to be shielded from personal liability for the
trial court's award of attorney fees on the ground that they acted "on behalf of their
respective limited liability companies." Appellants Br. at 14. But even the defendants
recognize that a court may disregard the corporate form under the equitable "alter ego"
doctrine.
"For purposes of appellate review, the trial court's decision to pierce the corporate
veil will be upheld if there is substantial evidence in favor of the judgment." Colman v.
Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 787 (Utah App. 1987). To disregard the corporate entity under
the equitable alter ego doctrine, "two circumstances must be shown: (1) Such a unity of
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual
no longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few individuals;
and (2) if observed, the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or
result in an inequity." Id. at 786 (citing Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596
P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979)).
As this Court has explained, "[t]he rationale used by courts in permitting the
corporate veil to be pierced is that if a principal shareholder or owner conducts his private
and corporate business on an interchangeable or joint basis as if they were one, he is
without standing to complain when an injured party does the same." Id. (citing Bone
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Constr. Co. v. Lewis, 148 Ga.App. 61, 250 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1978)); see also Lyons v.
Lyons, 340 So.2d 450, 451 (Ala.Civ.App.l976)("[a] court of equity looks through form to
substance and has often disregarded the corporate form when it was fiction in fact and
deed and was merely serving the personal use and convenience of the owner").
Here, defendants did not assert the bona fides of their purported limited liability
companies in opposing summary judgment at the trial court. (R. at 375-377.) And, as
shown in the Statement of Facts (infra, p. 9) the record contains substantial evidence
showing that that the separate personalities of the limited liability companies and their
owners, Glezos and Pettit, do not exist.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS HANDLING OF LAND
SOLUTIONS, L.C. AND 90 T H SOUTH JOINT VENTURE, LLC.
Defendants also claim the trial court erred in failing to order the joinder of Land

Solutions, L.C. and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC. (Appellant's Br. at 18.) Defendants
admit that this Court's review of this issue is limited to determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion. Id. at 16 (citing Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ^f 40, 29 P.2d
638). Defendants have again painted with a broad brush - not differentiating between
Land Solutions and 90th South Joint Venture in making this argument. This claim of
error should be rejected as well, but the reasons are different for the two entities.
A.

Land Solutions Was "De Facto" A Party To This Lawsuit.

With respect to Land Solutions, defendants simply misstate the proceedings in the
trial court. First, there is no question that "STC Holdings" was properly served, and that
it participated as a defendant throughout these proceedings. (R. at 18-20 (Proof of
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Service and Summons), 24-34 (Answer of STC Holdings).) Defendants claim that USTC
Holdings" is nothing more than an assumed name for Land Solutions, L.C. Indeed, that
was the basis of Land Solutions' motion to intervene. (R. at 35-36.)
It is well-settled that [a] corporation's use of a fictitious or assumed business name
does not create a separate legal entity, and the designation cd/b/a' is merely descriptive of
a corporation that does business under some other name." 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 133
(2007); see also 6 William Meade Fletcher, et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of
Corporations § 2442 (2007) (use of a fictitious business name does not create a separate
legal entity); Utah Valley v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1981) ("Paul Tanner
Homes is not a legal entity, it being only a 'dba' of Paul Tanner"); Pinkerton 's, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 40 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1348 (1996). Accordingly, when Bourne sued STC
Holdings it effectively sued Land Solutions.
Second, Land Solutions did intervene and participate in this case on a de facto
basis. On October 14, 2005, Land Solutions filed a motion to intervene in this action.
(R. at 35-37.) Bourne did not object to the addition of Land Solutions as a party, and the
trial court instructed movant's counsel to prepare an order and submit it to Bourne's
counsel for approval as to form. (R. at 41-42.) Bourne objected to defendants' form of
order, and sent defendants' counsel a revised version, approved as to form. (R. at 679706.) Defendants' counsel, apparently, never submitted the approved order to the trial
court for execution. (R. at 770: 7-14.)
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Notwithstanding this, the fact is that after moving to intervene, Land Solutions
participated in all proceedings before the trial court, without any objection from Bourne.
Indeed, after making the intervention motion, defendants' counsel appeared as "Attorney
for Defendants STEVE GLEZOS, STC HOLDINGS, LAND SOLUTIONS, L.C. and
GLEN PETTIT," (R. at 90, 97, 100, 105, 345, 380, 399, 467, 470, 584, 587, 597, 600,
655 and 657 (emphasis added)), and virtually every paper defendants filed was filed on
behalf of Land Solutions (R. at 90, 97, 100, 105, 110, 345, 380, 399, 467, 587, 597, 600
and 655). Indeed, defendants' "Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiffs Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment" was filed on behalf of 'w[t]he Defendants STEVE
GLEZOS, STC HOLDINGS, LAND SOLUTIONS, L.C. and GLEN PETTIT." (R. at
345-377.)
In similar circumstances, Utah courts have found that the party has intervened on a
"de facto basis." In Utah Ass 'n of Counties v. Tax Comm 'n, 895 P.2d 819 (Utah 1995),
the Utah Supreme Court said the following:
[I]t is unclear whether UAC [the Utah Association of
Counties] properly intervened in the hearing, (footnote
omitted). Although the counties submitted a formal motion to
intervene at the request of the Commission, it was not acted
upon. UAC did not join in that motion, but its counsel, who
was also representing the counties, actively participated
throughout the entire hearing, including regular examination
of witnesses with the permission of the Commission. At no
time did the Commission or [AT&T Communications] object
to UAC's participation. We therefore find that the
Commission has waived its right to challenge UACfs
participation in this review. UAC adequately intervened in
the hearing below on a de facto basis.
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Id. at 820 (citing Schulz, Davis & Warren v. Marinkovich, 203 Mont. 12, 661 P.2d 5, 8
(1983)); see also Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, \ 7-8, 989 P.2d 1073.
Under these precedents, there was no error by the trial court. Land Solutions was
"de facto" a party to the litigation. Indeed, it would elevate form over substance, and
would be unjust, to allow a party to obtain a favorable oral ruling on a motion to
intervene, thereafter act as if the motion had been granted, participate throughout the
proceedings, and after receiving an unfavorable ruling on the merits, raise as error the
trial court's failure to enter a written order allowing intervention - an order which the
party never submitted to the court for execution.
B.

90th South Joint Venture Need Not Be Joined As A Party.

Defendants, citing Cassidy v. Salt Lake Fire Civ. Serv. Council, 1999 UT App 65,
]f 9, 976 P.2d 607, correctly note that the issue of failure to join an indispensable party
may be raised for the first time on appeal. (Appellants Br. 16.) But the fact that the issue
may be raised for the first time on appeal does not mean that waiting until appeal to raise
the issue will be without consequence. 11 The leading case analyzing the effect of an
appellant's failure to raise the indispensable party issue in the trial court is the U.S.
Supreme Court's Provident Tradesmans Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968)

1 Although it may be raised for the first time on appeal, the issue of indispensability
under Rule 19 is not a jurisdictional question. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Southwestern Public Service Co., 104 F.3d 1205, 1211 n.4 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing 7
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1611, at 171-74 (2ded. 1986)).
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decision. ^ There several individuals who had been involved in a car accident sought a
declaration that the driver of the vehicle was a "permissive user" under the owner's
insurance policy. Id. at 106. While the vehicle owner's insurer was named as a
defendant, the vehicle owner himself was not. The case proceeded to judgment in favor
of the individuals. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment on the
ground that the vehicle owner was an indispensable party -an issue not raised in the trial
court. Id. at 106.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 107. It held that the Third
Circuit "erred in not allowing the judgment to stand." Id. at 109. The Court explained
that when the issue is raised for the first time on appeal, Rule 19's interests "must... be
viewed entirely from an appellate perspective since the matter of joinder was not
considered in the trial court." Id. at 109. Accordingly, though "the defendant may
properly wish to avoid multiple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for
a liability he shares with another. After trial, however, if the defendant has failed to
assert this interest, it is quite proper to consider it foreclosed." Id. at 110. Similarly, after
trial the plaintiffs interest in preserving a fully litigated judgment "should be overborne
only by rather greater opposing considerations than would be required at an earlier stage
when the plaintiffs' only concern was for a federal rather than a state forum." Id. at 112.

12 As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, "Rule 19 of the Utah rules is essentially
similar to rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, in addition to
applicable Utah cases, we look to the abundant federal experience in the area for
guidance." Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990).
37

Following Provident numerous courts have rejected indispensable party arguments
raised for the first time on appeal For instance, m Air-Exec, Inc. v. Two Jacks, Inc., 584
F.2d 942, 945 (10th Cir. 1978), the court stated:
The bank's interest was known at the time of the pretrial
order and mentioned in it. Defendants made no attempts to
force it to become a party to the litigation and made no
complaints about its absence until after trial. In the face of its
knowledge of the bank's interest it filed no objection to the
pretrial statement of admitted facts that the plaintiff is "the"
proper party to bring the action. Therefore it is bound by the
pretrial order, as above discussed. Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust v. Patterson (citation omitted), in an analogous
situation, states, "After trial. . . if the defendant has failed
to assert this interest, (to require joinder) it is quite
proper to consider it foreclosed. (Emphasis added).
See also Continental Insurance Co. of New York v. Cotton, 427 F.2d 48, 51 (9* Cir.
1970) (citing Provident).
1.

Defendants Did Not Argue That 90th South Joint Venture Was
Indispensable in the Trial Court.

On pages 16 to 18 of their appeal brief, defendants provide a long list of steps they
claim to have taken "to address the issue of defendants [sic] failure to join Land
Solutions, L.C. and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC." But an examination of defendants'
claimed "steps" shows that they do not relate to 90th South Joint Venture LLC. Rather,
they all relate to (i) defendants' argument that Land Solutions is an indispensable party
(Items 1, 2, 4, 9), (ii) defendants' claim that Glen Pettit should be dismissed (Items 5, 6,
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7,1:> 8) or (iii) are simply irrelevant (Items 3, 10). Indeed, had defendants really wanted
90 South Joint Venture, LLC to participate, the obvious move would have been to do
what Land Solutions did, seek intervention. That simple expedient would have solved
the problem, and avoided the mysterious and convoluted series of "steps" defendants
identify. 14
In truth, Defendants did not attempt to have 90th South Joint Venture LLC
intervene or otherwise attempt to have it joined as a party in the trial court. Even in their
Rule 60(b) Motion, defendants did not ask for 90th South Joint Venture to be joined as a
party. (R. at 661-662.) Given that no party asked the trial court to join 90th South Joint

13 In item 7, defendants mischaracterize their "Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Motion
for Relief From Judgment, Motion for New Trial and For Other Relief," as claiming
that 90th South Joint Venture LLC was one of the "real parties in interest."
(Appellants Br. 17.) In fact, with respect to Pettit, the motion claimed only that
Pettit's "sole involvement was through business entities, and then - because the sale
transaction actually failed to close - not at all." (R. at 585.)
14 Joinder pursuant to Rule 19 is contingent upon an initial requirement that the absent
party claim a legally protected interest relating to the subject matter of the action.
When persons are aware of an action, but choose not to claim an interest by failing to
join in the action, they are not considered necessary parties. See United States v.
Bowen, 172 F.3d 682, 689 (9th Cir. 1999). "If a defendant is capable of bringing into
the litigation a nonparty whose presence is allegedly required to fully resolve the
controversy and if that nonparty is otherwise capable of intervening, then the nonparty
cannot be considered indispensable under Rule 19(b)." Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Southwestern Public Serv. Co., 104F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 1997)(adopting
reasoning of Pasco Int'l (London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496, 503-504
(7th Cir. 1980)). In this matter, defendants have identified no jurisdictional or other
legal impediment to 90 South's intervention under Utah R. Civ. P. 24. In fact, 90th
South, through its the sole member and manager Glen Pettit, deliberately chose not to
intervene in this matter. Intentionally forgoing 90th South's right to intervene belies
Pettit's current argument that 90th South was either a necessary or indispensable party
under Utah R. Civ. P. 19.
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Venture LLC as a party, its failure to do so can hardly be asserted to be an abuse of
discretion. Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, If 40, 29 P.2d 638.
2.

This Court Should Not Require or Order 90th South Joint
Venture's Joinder.

Even if this Court, on appeal, were inclined to consider the issue notwithstanding
defendants' failure to urge it in the trial court, the record demonstrates that 90th South
Joint Venture is not a necessary party under Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In Landes v. Capital City Bank, et ai, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990), the Utah
Supreme Court explained
To determine whether a party is necessary, a court should
consider the two general factors in rule 19(a). First, a party
is necessary if cin his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties.' Second, a party is
necessary if
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest.
(Citations omitted.) The record demonstrates that neither factor is met here.
First, 90th South Joint Venture LLC's absence presents no obstacle to awarding
Bourne complete relief. The primary relief sought in the Complaint was a declaration
regarding the meaning and interpretation of the Purchase Agreement and, based on that
declaration, an order quieting title to the Property in Bourne. This relief could be - and
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was - granted regardless of whether 90 South Joint Venture appeared as a party.
Bourne is now free to deal with the Property as it chooses. Moreover, 90th South Joint
Venture does not have any defense to Bourne's contract based causes of action that was
not already presented by (or that could not have been presented by) the named
defendants.
til

Second, assuming arguendo that 90 South Joint Venture does claim an interest in
the Property, any such interest was adequately protected by the presence of Glen Pettit,
90th South Joint Venture LLC's manager and sole member. 90th South Joint Venture
LLC's interests in vindicating defendants' interpretation of the Purchase Agreement are
presumably identical to those of Pettit. See e.g., Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App 361,
\ 51, 58 P.3d 854 (finding that absent party's interests were adequately protected because
he was "a member of the family partnership" that was a party).
For similar reasons, the absence of 90 South Joint Venture does not leave any of
the parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations. Well-established principles of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion would prevent 90th South Joint Venture from litigating in a subsequent suit
claims for relief or issues that were (or could and should have been) litigated in this suit.
In general, these doctrines prevent parties or their "privies" from relitigating claims for
relief or issues "which were once adjudicated on the merits and have resulted in a final
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judgment." Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, f 27,
110P.3d678J5
Here 90 South Joint Venture and Pettit, its manager and sole member, are
unquestionably privies. Under Utah law, "[t]he legal definition of a person in privity
with another, is a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same
legal right." Press Publishing, Ltd., v. Matol Botanical Int'I, Ltd., 2001 UT 106, | 20, 37
P.3d 1121 (Utah 2001) (quoting Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978)).
Applying this definition, the Press Publishing court held that officers, directors, and
affiliates of the closely-held corporations were "privies" because their "legal rights and
interests are identical" with those of the defendant in a prior suit. Id. ]f 21, 37 P.3d at
1128. The same obtains here.
CONCLUSION

15 For claim preclusion to apply, three requirements must be met: "(1) [T]he subsequent
action must involve the same parties, their privies, or their assigns as the first action,
(2) the claim to be barred must have been brought or have been available in the first
action, and (3) the first action must have produced a final judgment on the merits of
the claim." Brigham Young, 2005 UT 19, % 26, 110 P.3d at 678 (quoting Culbertson
v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs, 2001 UT 108,1J13, 44 P.3d 642). For issue preclusion to
apply, four requirements must be met: "[1] [T]he party against whom issue preclusion
is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication; [2] the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the
one presented in the instant action; [3] the issue in the first action must have been
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and [4] the first suit must have resulted in a
final judgment on the merits." Id. \ 27 (quoting Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp.,
1999 UT 39 at Tfl8, 982 P.2d 65).
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For the reasons stated, Boume respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial
court's summary judgment order and judgment in all respects. Bourne further requests
that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of February, 2008.
DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP

Milo Steven Marsden
Craig R. Kleinman
Patricia C. Staible
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Horton V.
Bourne Partnership
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ADDENDUM A

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The statutes and rules whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or are of
central importance to the appeal are as follows:
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1)ffInterest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee,
trustee, or beneficial owner.
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who
offers a document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a
lien or other claim of interest in certain real property.
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real
property.
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present,
lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder,
mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real property
appears in the county recorder's records for the county in which the property is located.
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in
certain real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in
which the property is located.
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(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded
or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the
real property.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien -- Damages.
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against real
property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused
by the wrongful lien.
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct
the wrongful lien within ten days from the date of written request from a record interest
holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address of the
lien claimant, the person is liable to that record interest holder for $19000 or for treble
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs.
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs,
who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in
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Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, knowing or
having reason to know that the document:
(a) is a wrongful lien;
(b) is groundless; or
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7. Petition to nullify lien ~ Notice to lien claimant —
Summary relief — Finding of wrongful lien — Wrongful lien is void.
(1) Any record interest holder of real property against which a wrongful lien as
defined in Section 38-9-1 has been recorded may petition the district court in the county
in which the document was recorded for summary relief to nullify the lien.
(2) The petition shall state with specificity the claim that the lien is a wrongful
lien and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the record interest holder.
(3) (a) If the court finds the petition insufficient, it may dismiss the petition
without a hearing.
(b) If the court finds the petition is sufficient, the court shall schedule a hearing
within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrongful lien.
(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of the petition on the lien
claimant and a notice of the hearing pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4,
Process.
(d) The lien claimant is entitled to attend and contest the petition.
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(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or
not a document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not determine any other property
or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of any party.
(5) (a) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court determines that the
document is a wrongful lien, the court shall issue an order declaring the wrongful lien
void ab initio, releasing the property from the lien, and awarding costs and reasonable
attorney's fees to the petitioner.
(b) (i) The record interest holder may record a certified copy of the order with
the county recorder.
(ii) The order shall contain a legal description of the real property.
(c) If the court determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall dismiss
the petition and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the lien claimant. The
dismissal order shall contain a legal description of the real property. The prevailing lien
claimant may record a certified copy of the dismissal order.
(6) If the district court determines that the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1, the wrongful lien is void ab initio and provides no notice of claim or
interest.
(7) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings may
not be expedited under this section.
78-33-1. Jurisdiction of district courts ~ Form - Effect.
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The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or
negative in form and effect; and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2. Rights, status, legal relations under instruments or
statutes may be determined.
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or
franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights,
status or other legal relations thereunder.
Utah Code Ann. §78-33-11. Parties.
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which
involves the validity of a municipal or county ordinance or franchise such municipality or
county shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if a statute or state
franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid the attorney general shall be served with a
copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-12. Chapter to be liberally construed.
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal
relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property -Authorized.
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate
or interest in real property or an interest or claim to personal property adverse to him, for
the purpose of determining such adverse claim.
Utah R. Civ. P. 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders,
objection to commissioner's order.
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum.
Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party
opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition. Within five days after
service of the memorandum in opposition, the moving party may file a reply
memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in
opposition. No other memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may
attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine
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issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation
to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the
moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless controverted by the responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain
a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may
contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's
facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds
for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each
fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot
be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a
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plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person as described
in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties
before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment
rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties;
second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of
relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff
will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall
state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision
(a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23.
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or crossclaim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days
from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment
by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
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(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for
summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist
without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
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would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this
rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith
order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable
expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees,
and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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Utah R. Civ. P. 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all
or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from
having a fair trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question
submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application,
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that
it is against law.
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(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10
days after the entry of the judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
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